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 Trial by Market: A Thought Experiment 
 
By Michael Abramowicz* 
 
This Article considers the possibility of providing incentives to judges to decide cases 
in the same way that an appellate panel would decide them. Random selection of a 
proportion of cases for retrial could be used to encourage judges to place aside their 
preferences in deference to the perceived preferences of a majority of judges. 
Providing such incentives to judges may reduce the need for alternative approaches 
to reducing judicial discretion, such as substantive law based on rules rather than on 
discretion. An information market similarly could be used to accomplish the task of 
adjudication, with some cases randomly selected for traditional adjudication to 
discipline the information market participants. Such an approach may be more cost-
efficient than provision of monetary incentives to judges where information is widely 
dispersed, or where it is impractical for the government to hire enough judges to 
handle a large group of cases. Advantages and disadvantages of these approaches 
are discussed. 
 
The monetary compensation of a judge generally does not depend on how the judge 
resolves any given case.1 This regime might appear to be indispensable to an independent 
judiciary. If judges were paid based on how well they resolve cases, then some institution might 
be used to rate each judge’s performance, and judges might decide cases based on the perceived 
preferences of those acting on behalf of that institution. In theory, however, it would be possible 
for judges even in an independent judiciary to be compensated on the basis of the decisions that 
they reach, as long as no subjective ratings of judicial performance were to come from outside 
the judiciary itself.  
For example, a statute might specify that a judge’s compensation shall include a 
component that depends on objective measures of the judge’s performance. Such measures might 
include the number of cases that the judge has heard and the frequency with which an appellate 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. 
1 See, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000) (forbidding a judge from participating a case in which he or she has a direct 
financial interest). The incentives that determine how judges will decide cases are thus nonmonetary. See Posner (1993, p. 2) 
(“Almost the whole thrust of the rules governing compensation and other terms and conditions of judicial employment is to 
divorce judicial action from incentives—to take away the carrots and sticks, the different benefits and costs associated with 
different behaviors, that determine human action in an economic model.”). 
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court reversed the judge.2 Presumably, in such a regime, judges would have stronger incentives 
to resolve cases expeditiously and to do so without making potentially reversible errors. The 
puzzle thus arises: Why aren’t judges compensated based on their performance? 
Part I addresses this question by offering a simple model of a judicial system in which 
judges receive performance-based incentives. In this system, a small percentage of cases are 
randomly selected for retrial, and judges are compensated based on the results on retrial of cases 
over which they presided. The model illustrates the benefits of an incentive-based judicial 
compensation system, as well as some of its drawbacks. Incentives may discourage judges from 
resolving cases based on their idiosyncratic preferences. In addition, incentives may make rigid 
procedural rules less necessary and also may increase the attractiveness of discretion relative to 
rules in substantive law. On the other hand, incentive-based compensation increases judges’ 
uncertainty about how much income they will earn in any given time period. 
The model of Part I retains the assumption that judges are chosen through some process 
of social choice, such as appointment or election. If judges can be given monetary incentives to 
resolve cases as other judges would resolve them, however, then presumably third parties could 
be given incentives to resolve cases as judges would resolve them. Appointment and election 
processes serve as a screen that seeks to ensure that judges will resolve cases as society wishes, 
so providing financial incentives could reduce the importance of such a screen. It is thus possible 
to imagine a judicial system consisting of a very small number of public judges, whose function 
effectively is to discipline a much larger group of mercenary private judges. 
Part II describes an approach to creating such a system that would allow for private 
prediction without requiring the government to screen third parties at all to determine who can 
conduct an adjudication. The system would use an information market to evaluate a case. The 
third-party predictors in such a market would be compensated based on the results in a 
percentage of cases randomly selected after the close of the information market for traditional 
adjudication. The remaining cases would be resolved by the information market prediction. Part 
II briefly identifies some of the advantages and concerns about implementation of such a market. 
                                                 
2 For an analysis using such measures to rate sitting U.S. federal appellate judges, see Choi and Gulati (2004). 
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I. MONETARY INCENTIVES FOR JUDGES 
Perhaps the simplest criterion that might be used to evaluate trial judges would be the 
judges’ reversal rates. A regime that compensated judges based on this rate, however, might lead 
judges to resolve cases in a manner that would minimize the possibility of reversal, for example 
by resolving cases on the facts rather than on the law. For a compensation system to serve 
effectively without changing judicial incentives, it would need to have some means of reviewing 
judges’ decisions on factual issues as well as legal issues.  
A solution is for the appellate court to rehear a case in its entirety, reconsidering both 
factual and legal issues de novo. If appellate courts did this in our present judicial system, the 
district court decision would be of no greater moment than a nonbinding arbitration. Limitation 
of the types of issues that appellate courts may consider is thus a practical approach in a regime 
in which all cases can be appealed.3 It might be possible, however, to have appeals only for a 
subset of cases randomly selected after the trial court decision for full de novo review. Trial 
court decisions would thus still matter for many cases. Trial judges could then be graded based 
on the subset of cases randomly selected for appeal. The trial judges’ incentive would be to 
resolve cases as closely as possible to how the appellate court would resolve them, rather than to 
decide the cases on the facts to avoid review of law. 
Consider, for example, the following system: A case is randomly assigned to a trial 
judge, who resolves the case, either by imposing or denying liability. With some probability, the 
case would be randomly selected for trial by the appellate court. If the appellate court reached 
the same resolution as the trial judge, then the trial judge would receive some increment to base 
compensation.  
Of course, most cases involve more than a single binary choice. A case might have two 
binary issues, such as whether the plaintiff has standing and whether the plaintiff is entitled to 
relief, as well as a question of damages should the plaintiff prevail. A more elaborate system 
could accommodate that. For example, the system might result in some cases being randomly 
selected for redeterminations of damages. The trial judge’s salary increment would then depend 
on how close the trial judge was to the appellate court’s damages determination. These design 
                                                 
3 For a model explaining deferential review of trial court fact-finding, see Drahozal (1998). 
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details are beyond my scope, however, and I will for analytical convenience adhere for now to a 
case presenting a single issue with a binary resolution. 
Section I.A offers a simple formal model of this system, showing that an increase in 
compensation will make trial judges more likely to decide cases as the appellate court would 
decide them. Section I.B assesses whether reducing the effect of idiosyncratic judicial preference 
should count as a benefit or a cost, offering an informal argument and a formal one to describe 
the benefits of reducing idiosyncratic preferences, and then an informal assessment of the costs. 
Section I.C examines the consequences of a compensation system for judicial work, considering 
both static and dynamic effects. 
A. A Model of Incentivized Judging 
Suppose that a judge cares about three things: not wanting to resolve a case in a manner 
contrary to how the majority would resolve it (with the strength of this concern proportional to 
the proportion of all judges who would resolve the case in the same way), resolving a case 
according to the judge’s idiosyncratic preference, and minimizing the work it takes to resolve a 
case. More formally, we construct a loss function for a judge who must decide whether to impose 
liability (l = 1) or not to impose liability (l = 0). Let α, β, and γ be parameters, where α, γ > 0, 
and β can be either positive or negative; let p be the probability that the appellate panel would 
impose liability if hearing the case de novo; and let w be a variable representing the amount of 
work the judge decides to perform. The loss function can thus be represented as: 
L =  α│l – p│ + β(1 – l) + γw. 
If β > 0, then the judge has a personal preference to impose liability, and if β < 0, the judge has a 
personal preference not to impose liability. Either way, that personal preference may yield where 
the judge concludes that most appellate judges would resolve the case in the opposite way.  
This is, of course, a vastly simplified model of judging. It captures, however, that judges 
generally seek to avoid reversal and that they may have personal preferences as to how to resolve 
a particular case. It also demonstrates that different judges may have different personal 
preferences, and may attach different weights to the costs of reversal and of deciding cases 
contrary to their personal preferences. 
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For a given level of work, the judge chooses l to minimize L, given the judge’s estimate 
p′ of p. Thus, the judge will choose l = 1 if Ll=1< Ll=0, i.e. α(l – p′) < α p′ + β. It follows that the 
judge imposes liability where p′ > (α – β) / 2α.  
The provision of monetary incentives to judges effectively increases α. It is possible, of 
course, that very small monetary incentives might lead judges to count reversal as less of a cost, 
because they wish to demonstrate their independence and lack of concern for money. 
Presumably, though, at some level of incentives, judges will respond to those incentives, and I 
will assume that incentives are sufficiently high that the incentives increase α. The higher the 
value of α, the closer (α – β) / 2α to ½. The conclusion is thus entirely unsurprising: Providing 
judges with monetary rewards in cases that they decide the same way as the appellate panel will 
make judges more likely to decide those cases as they expect the majority of appellate panels to 
decide them. 
B. The Benefits and Costs of Conformity 
1. Benefits: An Informal Argument 
Monetary incentives would thus tend to induce conformity of trial judges to the perceived 
majority of appellate judges. Is this a desirable consequence? A simple argument that this is a 
benefit follows from the Condorcet Jury Theorem.4 Suppose that we believe that, at least in 
general, each of a group of people independently considering a problem has a greater than even 
chance of reaching the correct view on a particular question. Then, the greater the group, the 
greater the probability that a majority of the group reaches the correct answer. 
The theorem has a straightforward application to legal process. To be sure, in law we 
must acknowledge the caveat that answers may not be objectively correct or incorrect. But the 
same logic still applies. Start with two assumptions: first, that for at least some legal issues a 
“better” answer exists, even if cannot be objectively ascertained with certainty; and second, that 
a randomly selected judge is more likely to arrive at this answer than its opposite, even though 
personal preferences may affect that judge’s decision. These are minimal assumptions, for if they 
fail to hold, it is hard to justify the use of human judges rather than coin flips. The Condorcet 
                                                 
4 For a general discussion, see Grofman (1978). 
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conclusion is that the resolution of a larger panel of judges should be preferred to the resolution 
of a single judge.5 
Two additional assumptions are needed here to make the argument from Condorcet 
complete. First, we must assume that an individual judge’s estimate of the proportion of judges 
who would impose liability will generally be closer to the actual proportion than the judge’s own 
preferred resolution (zero or one) would be. That is, a judge must have some minimal ability, at 
least after working on a case, to estimate how many appellate judges would reach one resolution 
or another. Second, we must assume that the trial judges are not superior to the appellate judges 
in achieving a better resolution of the case. Given these assumptions, monetary incentives 
provide a social benefit by reducing the proportion of cases in which judges decide to resolve the 
cases in accord with the judges’ personal preferences rather than in accord with the anticipated 
resolutions of a majority of appellate judges. 
This reasoning may apply even in a context in which what is important is not a legal 
decision itself, but rather the anticipation of legal decisions by private parties. Consider, for 
example, a strict liability tort regime, and suppose that there are some cases in which it will be 
unclear whether the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury. Assume that ninety percent of judges 
in this group of cases would conclude that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury, while ten 
percent of judges would conclude that the defendant did not cause the injury but recognize that 
they are in the minority. Is it preferable to have a legal regime that would lead all judges to 
impose liability, or one that would result in ninety percent of judges imposing liability? 
Monetary incentives would push the legal system closer to the former. 
In the regime in which all judges would impose liability, potential defendants in such 
cases will internalize the full extent of injuries in such cases, even though there are some who 
believe that the defendants did not cause such injuries. In the regime in which only ninety 
percent of judges would impose liability, potential defendants would internalize ninety percent of 
the injuries. The only difference is thus the question of whether, after potential defendants have 
internalized ninety percent of the injuries, whether it is socially beneficial for the potential 
defendants to internalize the additional ten percent of the injuries. Assuming that all judges agree 
that it is socially beneficial for potential defendants to internalize all of the injuries that they 
                                                 
5 For an application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to the size of appellate panels, see Kornhauser and Sager (1986, pp. 97-98). 
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cause, ninety percent of judges would think it desirable for the potential defendants to internalize 
the additional ten percent of the injuries, because those judges would believe that the defendants 
actually caused the injuries. If each judge is more likely to be right than wrong on this question, 
there is at least a fifty percent chance (presumably, much greater) that potential defendants 
should internalize the additional ten percent of the injuries. Thus, the regime in which all judges 
impose damages is superior to one in which only ninety percent of judges impose damages. 
This argument is parallel to Coons (1964)’s defense of the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard in civil cases. Coons asks whether it makes sense to impose full liability on a 
defendant when the fact-finder concludes that there is a greater-than-fifty-percent chance that the 
defendant in fact caused the plaintiff’s injury, and no liability when the fact-finder concludes that 
there is a less-than-fifty-percent chance. Coons defends the discontinuity in the liability function 
by comparing it to an alternative liability function in which damages are multiplied by the fact-
finder’s estimate of the probability of causation. Once damages proportional to the probability of 
causation are awarded in a case in which the probability estimate is greater than fifty percent, 
there is still greater than a fifty percent chance that the additional damages should be imposed. 
The argument here moves Coons’s argument to a higher level of abstraction, with the probability 
that a case is decided correctly derived from various judges’ recommended outcomes rather than 
from a single fact-finder. 
The argument is perhaps easiest to understand using an extreme example and focusing on 
a single case. Suppose in a lawsuit between A and B, 99% of judges would rule for A. Let us 
assume that there is a correct, or at least a better, answer. There is a chance, of course, that the 
1% minority of judges are in fact correct, but from the disproportion, the chance would appear to 
be small. The incentivized judges issue is irrelevant 99% of the time, so to evaluate the 
argument, we must consider the 1% of situations in which the case happens to be assigned to a 
judge who adopts the minority position. Will this case more likely be resolved correctly if these 
judges follow their own opinion, or the dominant opinion? Because the minority position is 
probably wrong, the resolution will be more likely to be correct if the minority judges place aside 
their own views. Of course, the same analysis applies, albeit less strongly, when judges are more 
evenly divided. If the goal is to resolve a case correctly, majority resolution is best. 
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For those still skeptical, consider the following question: Should legislatures work 
according to lottery voting? That is, should we randomly select the vote of a single legislator on 
any particular issue? Even placing aside the problem that legislative resolutions would cycle, the 
proposal seems normatively unattractive, and those who have discussed lottery voting have 
imagined using it to construct the legislature rather than to resolve discrete issues being 
considered.6 The issue is less salient in the judicial context, because when a judge resolves an 
issue we do not necessarily whether a majority of judges would reach the opposing resolution, 
but the reasoning is the same. A court resolving an issue of law is more likely to resolve that 
issue properly when it resolves it in the way that most judges would resolve it than when it 
resolves it in the way that most judges would reject. Similarly, to the extent that a judge engages 
in fact-finding, a judge who interprets the facts of a case in that most other judges faced with the 
same facts would reject is, more likely than not, interpreting the facts incorrectly. 
2. Benefits: A Formal Argument 
It is straightforward to formalize the argument that it is beneficial to provide judges with 
incentives to act as the majority of judges would decide cases. Consider a universe of cases to be 
tried by the judicial system. In each case, assume that there is a correct answer, either that 
liability should be imposed or that it should not be imposed. Of course, we do not assume that 
anyone knows what this correct answer is. In addition, for each case, some proportion p of 
judges, if acting without monetary incentives, would impose liability. We define a “pure 
monetary incentives” condition to be one in which judges will always decide a case as the 
majority of judges would resolve that case, i.e. to find liability if and only if p > 0.5. We will 
initially compare error costs in the no incentives condition with those in the perfect incentives 
condition, and then turn to a regime in between the extremes. 
To compare the error costs, consider separately the two groups of cases, those in which 
the correct answer is to impose liability, and those in which the correct answer is not to impose 
liability. Let n(p) represent the expected distribution of the cases in which the correct answer is 
to impose liability, and n′(p) represent the expected distribution of the cases in which the correct 
answer is not to impose liability. We assume that where 0 <= p < 0.5, n(1 – p) > n(p). This is a 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Amar (1995). 
9 
fairly minimal rationality assumption, allowing for the possibility that there will be cases in 
which a majority of judges will reach the wrong answer. The assumption means only, for 
example, that in the universe of cases for which the correct answer is liability, there will be a 
larger number of cases in which 90% of judges would impose liability than in which 10% of 
judges would impose liability. This assumption would entail, among others, a normal distribution 
with mean to the right of 0.5 (cut off at the 0 and 1 extremes). Meanwhile, we will make the 
opposite assumption for the cases in which the correct answer is not to impose liability: Where 0 
<= p < 0.5, n′(1 – p) < n′(p). 
We also must offer some simple assumptions regarding the cost of errors. For the group 
of cases in which the correct answer is to impose liability, a failure to impose any liability 
imposes a cost of c, and for the group of cases in which the correct answer is not to impose 
liability, imposition of liability imposes a cost of c′. (Without loss of generality, we could allow 
for variation in c and c′ across cases, as long as the expected distribution of cases corresponding 
to any particular value of c or c′ met the above assumptions regarding n or n′.) For example, if in 
a group of cases, the correct answer is to impose liability but liability will be imposed only 30% 
of the time, then the average error cost per case will be 0.7c. 
We can now compare total error costs in the no incentives condition (ECNI) with total 
error costs in the perfect incentives condition (ECPI). Let us for now consider only the cases in 
which the correct answer is to impose liability, and ignore the cases in which the correct answer 
is not to impose liability. In the no incentives condition, for cases where p of judges would 
impose liability, the average error cost will be equal to c(1 – p). In the pure incentives condition, 
there will be no error costs for 0.5 <= p <= 1; when p < 0.5, however, no liability will be 
imposed, and the full error cost of c will be borne. Thus, we can represent the error costs for the 
cases in which the correct answer is to impose liability as follows: 
(1)  .)()1(
1
0
dppnpcECNI ∫ −=  
(2)  .)(
5.0
0
dppcnECPI ∫=  
The pure incentives condition reduces error costs if and only if ECPI < ECNI, which can 
be rearranged to 
(3)  .)()1()(
1
5.0
5.0
0
dppnpcdppcpn ∫∫ −<  
By application of the Chain Rule, this is equivalent to 
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(4)  .)1()(
5.0
0
5.0
0
dppcpndppcpn ∫∫ −<  
This inequality must hold, as a result of our assumption that where 0 <= p < 0.5, n(1 – p) > n(p). 
Thus, the pure incentives condition reduces error costs in the cases in which the answer is to 
impose liability. 
 Parallel logic can be used to show that the pure incentives condition also reduces error 
costs relative to the no incentives condition for the cases in which the correct answer is not to 
impose liability. Thus, regardless of the proportion of cases in which the correct answer is to 
impose liability, for the entire universe of cases, the pure incentives condition reduces error costs 
relative to the no incentives condition.  
We could also define an incomplete incentives condition as one in which a judge will act 
like judges in the perfect incentives condition with probability θ, and like judges in the no 
incentives condition with probability 1 – θ. It follows that ECII = θECPI + (1 – θ)ECNI, and thus 
that for θ > 0, ECII < ECNI. Thus, under the assumptions above, over the universe of cases, 
incomplete monetary incentives will reduce error costs relative to no monetary incentives. 
3. Costs 
The most obvious argument against inducing greater conformity of judges to perceived 
majority resolutions is that manifest disagreement may itself have some benefit. The 
“percolation” of issues among disagreeing judges may increase the possibility that an 
authoritative decisionmaker, such as a higher court or the legislature, will reach the correct 
resolution of the issue. It may sometimes be useful for trial judges to challenge the opinions of 
appellate judges, and perhaps in the long run to change those opinions.  
More generally, a regime with monetary incentives might affect judges’ willingness to 
write opinions explaining their decisions. Perhaps monetary incentives might make judges less 
interested in writing opinions because they are more concerned about simply determining how 
majorities would resolve cases, or perhaps they would be more interested in writing opinions 
because they wish to convince appellate panels that they have resolved cases correctly. 
 My purpose, of course, is not to suggest that greater judicial conformity to the majority of 
appellate panels is always desirable, let alone that monetary incentives are always desirable. I 
have not even considered the effect of monetary incentives on the perceived legitimacy of the 
courts or assessed whether such legitimacy matters. My central point, however, is that there is at 
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least an argument for reducing the influence of idiosyncratic judicial preference on individual 
cases. Treating like cases alike is not merely more fair than randomly deviating in some cases, it 
also may be more efficient. Paying judges to act as the majority of judges are expected to act is 
one way of increasing the proportion of like cases that are treated alike. If one goal of a system 
for resolving a certain class of disputes is to reduce the proportion of cases affected by 
idiosyncratic preference, then incentivizing judges to act as the majority may help in some 
contexts.  
C. Effects on the Judicial Process 
The more a judge works on a given case, the better is likely to be the judge’s estimate of 
the proportion of judges who would impose liability. As indicated above, increased monetary 
incentives should push the threshold above which the judge imposes liability closer to ½. A 
judge may work harder in a regime with more monetary incentives, because the judge may care 
more once provided with incentives (that is, total loss is higher in a regime with greater 
incentives), and because there may be more cases in which additional work might affect the 
decision the judge reaches.7 
The legal system currently uses means other than monetary incentives to prevent shirking 
by judges. One possible justification of many rules and norms of judicial procedure, such as the 
requirement that judges hear testimony when there are genuine issues of material fact,8 is that 
these requirement increase judicial work effort. If a judge could resolve a case pretrial when the 
judge personally believed that testimony would not make a difference, then a judge might be 
tempted to resolve cases pretrial even when the judge recognized that testimony might affect the 
judge’s ultimate decision. The use of a relatively objective summary judgment standard, rather 
than a subjective standard, helps prevent judicial shirking. This benefit comes at some cost, 
however, in cases where live testimony in fact would not make a difference. 
Such rules and norms may become less necessary once judges are given monetary 
incentives. Consider, for example, a legal system that adjudicates disability claims, and assume 
                                                 
7 This conclusion depends, of course, on the probability distribution of cases. Suppose a judge in a regime without monetary 
incentives would impose liability only when the judge’s estimate of the proportion of judges who would do so exceeds 0.9, but 
the judge would impose liability in a regime with monetary incentives when the judge’s estimate of the proportion exceeds 0.6. If 
there are many cases in which the judge’s estimate is around 0.9 and comparatively few in which the estimate is around 0.6, then 
a judge may work less hard in a regime with monetary incentives. 
8 See, for example, FED. R. CIV. P. R. 56 (providing the summary judgment standard). 
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for now that the facts of such cases are so varied that the assessment of whether an applicant is 
disabled ultimately must be a discretionary one. As the Supreme Court noted in Matthews v. 
Eldridge,9 one argument for providing a right to an oral hearing in such cases is that such a 
hearing may reduce the probability of an erroneous disposition. This argument presumably does 
not apply in cases in which a decisionmaker is genuinely sure in advance of an oral hearing of 
the eventual decision, but a decisionmaker might falsely claim to be sure of the eventual decision 
if such a claim would allow the decisionmaker not to hold a hearing. A right to a hearing may be 
a second-best solution in a world in which we cannot verify whether a decisionmaker truly 
believes that a hearing would not make a difference. But monetary incentives will tend to 
provide decisionmakers with incentives for further inquiry if and only if that inquiry in fact 
might make a difference. Thus, an adjudicative system with monetary incentives for judges 
should tend to afford decisionmakers more procedural discretion than an adjudicative system 
without monetary incentives. 
The same is true with regard to substantive discretion. One justification for a system of 
rules rather than a system of judicial discretion is that rules reduce the possibility of idiosyncratic 
preference affecting case results. Shavell (2004) models adjudication as an agency problem, in 
which the judge as agent may choose to act on his own ideological beliefs rather than those of 
the principal, society at large. A familiar drawback of rules is that they are overinclusive and 
underinclusive, and thus that they may misrepresent what the preference of society would be in a 
discretionary regime. If the appellate judiciary as a whole is more representative of the views of 
society as a whole than any randomly selected trial judge (or than any randomly selected 
appellate panel), then monetary incentives may tend to lead judges to act more in accordance 
with the preferences of society than they otherwise would. Thus, monetary incentives and rule-
based substantive law may be two alternative means of inducing judges to act as society would 
prefer. In a regime with monetary incentives, rules are less necessary. It may thus be possible for 
the legal system to achieve the best of both worlds: discretion that allows close tailoring to the 
facts of cases, as well as relatively consistent treatment across decisionmakers. 
Once again, considering a system of disability adjudication can make this point clearer. 
Suppose that it is in fact possible to develop a rule-based system of disability payments, but such 
                                                 
9 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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a system would lead to results in some subset of cases that most people (and judges) would 
believe to be contrary to the goals of the program. Such a rule-based system might nonetheless 
be preferable to a system that afforded judicial discretion, for example if a large percentage of 
judges in a discretionary system would often rule based on their own beliefs about economic 
distribution independent of the facts of any particular case. But if the median appellate judge 
provides a reasonably close proxy for the social consensus on disability, then monetary 
incentives might lead judges in a discretionary regime largely to ignore their individual political 
preferences. So, the disability system could allow discretion yet discourage ideological 
decisionmaking. 
Finally, let us consider briefly the effects of monetary incentives on the composition of 
the judiciary itself. The regime might affect the reputation of the judiciary and therefore affect 
the willingness of talented lawyers to serve in it. If judges are seen as mere mercenaries, then 
lawyers might be less willing to serve. On the other hand, if the regime in fact reduced 
idiosyncratic judging, the reputation of the judiciary could rise, and lawyers might be more 
willing to serve.  
A system of monetary incentives also might change the number of judges necessary to 
populate the judiciary. Once again, there are competing effects. If appellate adjudication now 
requires rehearing of the facts as well as consideration of issues of law, more appellate judges 
might be needed. But because only some cases would be randomly selected for appeal, fewer 
judges might be needed.  
Self-selection by lawyers might affect the quality of the judiciary. Presumably, more 
talented lawyers will better understand cases and thus be better able to predict how appellate 
panels will resolve these cases. These lawyers should thus be more willing to serve than lawyers 
with lesser talents, assuming that lawyers have some information about how successful they are 
likely to be.  
Perhaps the most significant effect, however, would be to discourage judicial service as a 
result of the increase in the variance of expected compensation, even assuming that average 
expected compensation remains constant. This variance could be quite high, especially if only a 
small number of a judge’s cases in any given year are reviewed. A judge’s compensation would 
depend not only on how successful the judge was at estimating the proportion of appellate panels 
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that would impose liability, but also on which cases happened to be chosen for review and on 
which panels happened to be chosen to review those cases. One answer to the question of why 
judges do not receive performance incentives is thus the same answer to the question of why 
many employees who receive annual salaries do not receive performance incentives: the 
increased risk that accompanies such incentives can reduce the attractiveness of the overall 
compensation package. 
II. INFORMATION MARKET-BASED ADJUDICATION 
Part I has described one mechanism by which trial judges could be given incentives to 
predict decisions of appellate judges. The mechanism belongs to a broad class of mechanisms 
called “scoring rules,” and it has long been recognized that scoring rules can be used to provide 
parties with incentives to make accurate predictions.10 There is, however, an alternative 
technology for encouraging accurate predictions: information markets.11 Information markets 
have been shown to be accurate predictors in a range of settings.12 Unlike scoring rules, 
information markets aggregate the predictions of multiple predictors and thus can incorporate 
dispersed information.  
A simple information market might be used to predict a binary judicial decision as 
follows: For $1, anyone could purchase two shares, one corresponding to liability and one 
corresponding to nonliability. Once the case were tried, then the shares corresponding to the 
actual decision would be liquidated at $1, and the shares corresponding to the reverse decision 
would be liquidated at $0. At any given time, the price at which shares traded would provide a 
prediction of the probability that the court would find liability. Indeed, information markets like 
this already exist for certain high-profile cases.13 
This simple information market will not be sufficient here for at least two reasons. First, 
as described above, the case is eventually tried. The model in Part I sought to discipline judicial 
decisionmaking by selecting only some portion of cases for trial. The trick is to create an 
information market that will work even when there is only some probability that a decision 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Clemen (2002); and Winkler (1969). 
11 See, for example, Abramowicz (2004); and Hanson (1995). 
12 See, for example, Berg et al. (2000); Forsythe et al. (1992).  
13 See, for example, www.tradesports.com (offering information markets on cases involving Martha Stewart, Michael Jackson, 
and Kobe Bryant). 
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eventually will be reached. In the cases that are not randomly selected for trial, the information 
market prediction of a trial could be used as an alternative to the trial itself. Second, there is little 
incentive for anyone to participate in this market. To stimulate interest and accurate predictions, 
there must be some effective subsidy to the market. 
Recent literature on information markets describes a mechanism that may seem more 
akin to traditional scoring rules than to a securities market, but the mechanism still can aggregate 
predictions of a number of individuals. It is straightforward to adapt this mechanism to 
implement a subsidized information market in which there is only some probability of a decision. 
Part II.A describes briefly how an information market might perform the task of adjudication. 
Part II.B then discusses some of the benefits and costs of such an approach. 
A. An Information Market for Adjudication 
An information market might be used to accomplish the task of adjudication in cases that 
do not settle. The market, modeled on the information market designs described in Hanson 
(2003) and Abramowicz (2004), could work through the following algorithm: 
(1) The government would announce a market subsidy for the group of cases. 
(2) For each case in the group, the government would announce 0.5 as an initial 
prediction of the result of adjudication. Denote this prediction p0. 
(3) The government would then auction off the right to be the next predictor, with the 
auction revenues added to the market subsidy. The third party winning the auction would then 
make a prediction p1. (The purpose of this step is to eliminate any windfall that might exist by 
virtue of being the first predictor and to eliminate any race that might exist to become that 
predictor.14) 
(4) Other third parties could then make additional sequential predictions for some period 
of time, p2 through pn. (The precise end time of the market would not be announced, to prevent 
interested parties from making predictions at the last instant.) 
(5) With some positive probability, the case is randomly selected for traditional 
adjudication. In these cases, let r = 1 if the court imposes liability and 0 otherwise. In the cases 
                                                 
14 If there is a second-mover advantage, no one might bid to become the first predictor. To overcome this predictor, negative bids 
could be allowed. If the highest bid were a negative number, the bid amount would be removed from the market subsidy to pay 
the first predictor. 
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not selected for traditional adjudication, market participants receive and pay nothing.15 If a case 
is not selected for traditional adjudication, then the last prediction controls, so liability is 
imposed if pn > 0.5.16 (The parties might then be given an opportunity to settle the damages issue, 
and if settlement fails, an information market akin to that described here could be used to 
determine the amount of damages.) 
(6) Each predictor in the cases selected for adjudication receives a score si, which reflects 
the improvement in the prediction provided by predictor i over predictor i-1. Thus, si = (1 – │r – 
pi│) – (1 – │r – pi-1│) = │r – pi-1│ – │r – pi│.  
(7) Predictors with positive scores receive money from the government; those with 
negative scores pay money to the government. Let win = the sum of all positive si across all 
cases, and let lose = the absolute value of the sum of all negative si. Then, each predictor with a 
negative si pays the amount of the market subsidy multiplied by the absolute value of si / win. 
The market subsidy (including the auction revenues) plus these payments are then shared among 
those with positive scores, so that each predictor with a positive si receives the market subsidy 
multiplied by (si / win)*(1 + (lose / win)).17 
 A full discussion of the mechanics of information markets is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Several points are worth noting, however. 
Incentives to invest in research. Because predictors are rewarded for improving the 
previous predictions, potential predictors’ incentive to invest in research on a case depends on 
the extent to which information is likely to allow the potential predictor to improve on the 
current probability assessment. Thus, the information market has the useful property of directing 
the government’s subsidy toward those cases in which research is most likely to change initial 
assessments. 
                                                 
15 Auction revenues could be removed from the market subsidy in such cases and refunded to the initial predictors. The point is 
not an important one, however, as net auction revenues received should be approximately the same whether the revenues are 
refunded are not. If, for example, in half of cases the winning bidder will lose the auction revenues and receive nothing in return, 
then bidders will bid only half as much. 
16 An alternative approach would be to impose liability in proportion to the probability of victory. For a recent proposal arguing 
that arbitrators should impose damages in proportion to the expected value of a reward at trial, see Joshua Davis, Expected Value 
Arbitration, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 47 (2004). See also sources cited id.at 48 n.8 (discussing the possibility of compromise or 
probabilistic verdicts). 
17 Some alternative distribution rule is needed in the unlikely event that no predictor in any case selected for traditional 
adjudication improved on the previous prediction. See Abramowicz (2004). The danger of this would be greatest if there were a 
very small number of cases and a very small number of predictors in each. 
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Litigants’ incentives to participate and to manipulate. Litigants would retain incentives to 
convince the participants in information markets of their positions, just as they would try to 
persuade judges in the model of Part I. Presumably, the information market would not eliminate 
the need for some discovery regime (unless an additional information market were constructed to 
resolve discovery disputes, with only a small percentage of discovery disputes brought to a 
court). Litigants, however, would naturally have some incentive to reveal requested information 
to alleviate suspicions of market participants.18 The presentation of evidence to the market, 
however, could be informal, as litigants would have incentives to present information in 
whatever format would be sufficient to provide information to market participants.   
 Litigants also might seek to participate in the information market themselves, to the 
extent that they believe that any trading losses that they suffer will be less than any benefit to 
them if the case is not randomly selected for adjudication. Other market participants, however, 
would have an incentive to identify such self-interested predictions and make contrary 
predictions. Hanson and Oprea (2004) argue that manipulation will tend not to affect information 
market prices, and indeed may tend to make information market prices more accurate because 
such attempts effectively increase the returns to informed trading. The extent to which 
manipulation strategies may be successful is, of course, an empirical question. Self-interested 
trading could simply be banned, though enforcement may be more difficult than enforcement of 
analogous bans on bribing judicial officials. 
Proportion of cases selected for traditional adjudication. The government faces a 
tradeoff in determining the proportion of cases to be selected for traditional adjudication. The 
higher the percentage, the greater the cost of performing traditional adjudication. Participants in 
the information market, however, bear some risk from the uncertainty about whether a case will 
be selected for traditional adjudication. The more cases that are selected, the less random will be 
the market participants’ rewards, and the more closely the participants’ returns can be expected 
to correlate with their abilities and efforts.  
If traditional adjudication is particularly expensive (for example, because of the need to 
have formal trial procedures), it might be possible to reduce the total cost of adjudication by 
having multiple information market stages. For example, ten percent of cases might be selected 
                                                 
18 For a model of how an unraveling effect may augment voluntary incentives to reveal information, see Milgrom & Roberts 
(1986). 
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for adjudication in a second-phase information market, with an additional subsidy provided for 
resolution of the cases in that information market. Of those cases, ten percent might be selected 
for traditional adjudication. The result of the second-phase information market would be used to 
pay off predictors in the first-phase information market. The additional subsidy means that this 
approach will be more expensive than simply providing that one percent of cases should be 
randomly selected for adjudication. The subsidy, however, could be small, because private 
parties will already have had incentives to inform themselves about a case in earlier stages. The 
subsidy might be less than the total cost of a regime that would provide that ten percent of cases 
should be randomly selected for traditional adjudication. In addition, the results of a second-
phase information market might be more predictable than the results of a traditional adjudication, 
reducing the risk to market participants. 
Effect of the traditional adjudication. If the goal of this system is to reduce the influence 
of idiosyncratic preference on decisions, that goal will be accomplished only incompletely, 
because in cases randomly selected for traditional adjudication, judges may still have discretion. 
If this is sufficiently undesirable, the information market could be used to resolve the amount 
that the defendant must pay the plaintiff in all cases, including those selected for traditional 
adjudication. The problem, of course, is that the litigants would no longer have an incentive to 
participate in the traditional adjudication. Thus, the traditional adjudication would need to be not 
so traditional after all. For example, adjudicators might informally consider all evidence that the 
litigants previously presented in any form to the information market.  
B. Evaluating the Information Market Approach 
The benefits and costs of the information market approach are similar to the benefits and 
costs of providing judges monetary incentives to decide cases. Just as providing judges with 
monetary incentives limited the need for formal judicial procedure, an information market would 
not need formal procedures at all. A drawback to the approach is that participation in the 
information market is risky, just as judges faced risk with performance incentives, and the 
government effectively must pay for this risk, for example by receiving less revenue in the 
auctions to determine the first predictor than it would in a system with no risk. In contrast to the 
system of incentivized judging, participants in the information market can lose money in 
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individual cases. Private parties, however, might be better able than judges to diversify risk, for 
example by working together in firms. 
There are three significant benefits to the information market approach relative to the 
incentivized judging approach. First, the market eliminates the need for society to screen trial 
judges. Providing judges monetary incentives limited the need to screen judges, because judges 
would no longer be as motivated by ideological concerns, and because judges lacking ability 
would tend to opt not to serve. There was still some danger, however, that a judge might be 
willing to sacrifice income to achieve an ideologically preferred resolution. If it indeed is true 
that information markets will not easily be subject to manipulation, then participants in 
information markets will not be able to make such a tradeoff. A participant who makes a bad 
prediction not only may lose money, but also may see a subsequent predictor’s assessment 
determine the outcome of the case. If, however, contrary to the initial empirical evidence, 
information markets are subject to manipulation, then trading would need to be restricted to a 
preapproved group of traders, and screening could be more expensive. 
Second, and following directly from the first point, the information market is easily 
scalable. It can be used for a small number of cases or a large number of cases, for cases 
involving small amounts of money and for cases involving large amounts of money. In part, this 
scalability is inherited from the system of incentivized judging in Part I. Because formal 
procedures are less necessary with incentivized judging than with traditional adjudication, and 
perhaps even less necessary with the information market, the information market may reduce the 
minimum fixed cost associated with an adjudication relative to traditional adjudication. Just as 
important, the elimination of the need to hire judges (other than those who will hear the 
randomly selected cases) makes it straightforward to create quickly adjudicative systems 
involving very large number of cases. Creating administrative bureaucracies to handle traditional 
adjudication may be far more cumbersome when it becomes necessary to hire large numbers of 
judges.  
Third, the information market approach may be superior to incentivizing judges where 
some parties other than the litigants may already have good information about a particular case, 
or where multiple parties might have information that the litigants might not find in a traditional 
adjudicative process. The information market approach gives those with information incentives 
20 
to participate in the process. This could be especially useful if information about a case were 
widely distributed. 
The information market should be efficient even if no third party initially possesses any 
information about the case. In such cases, there may well be only a single predictor, especially if 
the cost of becoming sufficiently acquainted with a case to improve upon the prediction of the 
initial predictor is higher than the expected benefit. If that is so, then the market effectively 
works like a scoring rule for the first predictor.19 Because that first predictor would still be 
competing against the first predictor in other cases, the first predictor would retain an incentive 
to make an accurate prediction of the case outcome. In these circumstances, the information 
market becomes a privatized version of the incentivized judging model of Part I, with the private 
provider of adjudication services selected in the auction as the first predictor. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Neither an adjudicative system providing monetary incentives for judges nor a system 
that accomplishes adjudication with a market mechanism is necessarily cheaper than traditional 
adjudication. Because of the uncertainty that judges and participants will face over the income 
that they can earn, these systems could even be more expensive than a traditional adjudicative 
system that pays judges a fixed salary. Nonetheless, these systems may be particularly useful in 
adjudicative contexts in which there is a high danger and concern about idiosyncratic judicial 
preferences affecting substantive results. Because incentives reduce idiosyncratic judging, they 
may make more feasible adjudicative systems without procedural formalities or rule-bound 
systems, and informality itself may produce cost savings. An information market may be a 
particularly useful way of resolving large numbers of small claims. 
Market-based judging may be most useful to enable adjudicative programs that would be 
infeasible with traditional adjudicative approaches. Suppose, for example, that a government 
wished to offer a fund for trade adjustment assistance, but the circumstances of those affected by 
trade varied so much that it would not be possible to craft rules that would calculate the damages 
from free trade that individuals suffered with acceptable accuracy. The government might be 
                                                 
19 Indeed, this is the central reason for constructing an information market in accordance with the algorithm above, rather than as 
an information market involving trading of securities. In information markets based on trading of securities, low liquidity may 
limit market accuracy. See Hanson (2003). 
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hesitant to create a bureaucracy to handle such claims, especially if individual agency 
adjudicators were expected to rule inconsistently. An information market, supplemented by an 
agency assigned to hear a small percentage of claims, might provide a solution. The government 
could specify the percentage of the fund that would be used to subsidize the information market, 
and claimants could receive shares in the remainder of the fund based on the awards determined 
by the information market. Even a relatively small subsidy, perhaps amounting to a few dollars 
per claim, could accomplish at least a quick-and-dirty distribution that might not be possible with 
a more traditional approach. 
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